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Introduction 
 
Economists are in front of a new challenging and growing research field, namely, 
management practices and their relation to firms’ performance. 
Management and in particular, human resources management have, up to 
recently, been a matter of study and discussion for scholars in business 
administration and organizational behaviour, as well as for industrial 
psychologists. 
How an organisation manages its employees, how is its hierarchical structure, 
how it outlines the reward’s systems, which ways of decision-making and 
resolving conflicts are accepted, all these were subjects of many prominent 
studies of the last century.  
Among these, Geert Hofstede (2001) owns the merit of having realized one of 
the first large firm-level cross-country surveys during the 60's. In “Culture’s 
Consequences” he describes his findings at IBM, showing the importance of 
cultural differences and how these were reflected in the management of an 
organisation. Hofstede six-dimensions model became an important tool for the 
management of the workforce in an international business setting.  
From that time research has focused not only on the roots of management 
practices but also on how they matter for the performance of the firm and, at an 
aggregate level, for the industry and the country productivity. These issues have 
shown to become a multidisciplinary field of research driving the interest also of 
economists that were mostly concerned with the persistency of productivity 
differentials across businesses.  
Chad Syverson (2011), for instance, describes these patterns of productivity 
dispersion for the four-digit industry in the U.S manufacturing sector. Plants at 
the 90th percentile of the productivity distribution produce double as much as at 
the 10th percentile, in average terms. In developing countries the magnitude and 
the persistency of these productivity variations grow even larger. To better grab 
the insights of these facts we should think that firm-level productivity differences 
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account also at the aggregate level. Indeed, aggregate variation in TFP depends 
on the variation of firms’ productivity, the so called within effects, and on 
selection mechanisms of the market, the between effects, especially in the long-
term period. The combination of these two effects will, therefore, have important 
implications for the growth and wellbeing of a country. 
If the evidence of productivity dispersion is already ascertained, what is 
becoming very appealing is the research for the sources of productivity growth. 
Recalling Syverson, what determines productivity? Why do firms, within the 
same business, differ so much in the amount of outputs, given the same level of 
inputs? 
The causes are manifolds and can be related to idiosyncratic characteristics of 
firms, like ownership and quality of the workforce, to management and 
production practices, as well as to more external factors belonging to the 
environment in which the firm operates, e.g. competition and regulatory 
environment. 
Here I will focus mostly on issues that operate within the firm, reviewing 
economists' research on the levers of productivity, in particular on the impact of 
human resources management practices. Pay-for-performance schemes, 
teamwork, cross-training, flexible job assignments are only a few examples of 
important work practices that have shown to be very successful for workers' 
productivity. 
Nonetheless, I will investigate the importance of the complementarities and 
synergies among these management practices, as these show to be highly 
correlated to firm's better performance. 
The entrance of economists in this new field of study was supported by an 
improved offer of high quality micro-level data as well as advancements in 
econometrics, able to address selection and omitted variables biases, and control 
for endogeneity. Economists take the fundamental notions of maximisation, 
efficiency, equilibrium, and make use of a new empirical research strategy, also 
called “insider econometrics” (Ichiniowski and Shaw, 2009), in order to gain 
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deeper understanding of the processes governing managers’ day-to-day activity. 
“Insider econometrics” research uses micro-level data of managers and 
employees inside firms that share the same production process and combines it 
with econometric techniques in order to acquire information on when and why 
management practices matter. The increased availability of panel data, together 
with the use of randomized field experiments, are supporting the evidence of an 
underlying casual relationship between management and firms' productivity.  
This stream of research shed a new light on the management of the organisation 
and it raised the challenging issue of whether management can be considered like 
a technology, that once introduced into the production function, captures the 
variations in output that cannot be accounted by the observable inputs.  
Hence, besides some limitations in testing for causality, the overall evidence of 
the research shows a strong correlation between a bundle of managerial practices 
and TFP, greater market share of the firm and growth, when considering for a 
dynamic context. 
The economist eye that looks inside the black box of the firm can not only 
observe very interesting processes but it can also provide precious insights and 
practical guidance to managerial activity that generally lead to better firm 
performance and growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   4	  
Chapter 1 
 
Finding the reasons behind firms’ heterogeneity: Management practices 
 
“Within the firm managers are conductors of an input orchestra. They coordinate 
the application of labor, capital and intermediate inputs. Just as a poor conductor 
can lead to a cacophony rather than a symphony, one might expect poor 
management to lead to discordant production operations.” (Syverson, 2011) 
 
Firms’ heterogeneity in terms of performance can be investigated looking at 
several data from their accounts. Profitability, growth rates, Tobin's Q and 
survival rates are subjects of study though, with the increased availability of data 
the major focus is on firms' total factor productivity (TFP). Productivity, or the 
residual, as it is commonly calculated, can be defined as the explanatory measure 
for the gap between output and inputs. Most recent studies on the impact of 
information and communication technologies on firms’ productivity have only 
partly accounted for the productivity differentials and the residual is still 
considered the “measure of our ignorance”, as Robert Solow called it. Empirical 
evidence shows that firms' differences in productivity are persistent over time 
and across countries but, most astonishing, they are also industry resistant and 
last with homogeneous goods. 
Finding the reasons behind firms’ heterogeneity in terms of performance has 
become a major field of investigation and of speculation. There are many factors 
that can account for the productivity dispersion and they can be internal as 
external to the firm. Of course the interactions and complementarities between 
these factors are as well important subjects of study.  
One stream of research among economists looks at management practices as 
major drivers of firms’ productivity. Up to now the importance of the impact of 
management was sort of neglected in the panorama of applied economic research 
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but as economists increase the amount of data, they can find more hypotheses to 
test and more possible determinants of productivity. 
 
1.1  How to measure management practices: a new evaluation tool 
 
 On this ground, working papers of Van Reenen, Bloom and Sadun represent 
very comprehensive studies. They conducted three waves of survey in 2004, 
2006 and 2009, collecting data on management information for around 8000 
firms in 20 different countries. Their research project, 
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org, is an interdisciplinary work aimed at the 
study of the causes and consequences of management practices using detailed 
firm-level management data collected across a variety of medium-sized firms in 
manufacturing, retail, acute care hospitals and schools, as well as across 
countries and industries.  
Using a new practice evaluation tool, developed by a consultancy firm, they run 
“double-blind” phone interviews to plant managers, they collected data on 
management practices for daily and close-up operations and they gathered 
information on eighteen management practices in four broad areas: operations, 
monitoring, targets and incentives.  
In research paper of 2007, Bloom and Van Reenen explain the management 
practices evaluation tool and how it was implemented. The four broad categories 
were investigated through open questions. Specifically, in the “operations” 
category, questions on management practices focus on the introduction of 
modern manufacturing techniques, on the documentation of process 
improvements and the reasoning behind it.  
“Monitoring” is analyzed asking about performance tracking and review and how 
consequence management is implemented.  
The “targeting” section deals with target setting, type, assessment and 
interconnections. Finally, “incentives” were evaluated questioning on human 
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bonuses, showing the importance of strategic human resource management for 
firm performance. Management practices were then mapped into a scoring grid 
going from one to five, where one stands for worst practice while five for best 
one. This evaluation tool helps to measure management practices but it raises 
also questions and doubts about what can be considered best practice because of 
the different business situations. Whether there exist universal management 
practices or if they rather depend on contingent situations is still a matter of 
discussion. Therefore the research focused only on a subset of basic management 
practices for which there is evidence of a solid association with performance, 
independently on country, industry and products.  
The results of this research project display great differences in management 
practices across countries. In research papers of 2007, 2010 and 2012 the cross 
country patterns look very similar with the United States scoring the highest 
adoption of best practices, followed by Japan and Germany and a block of mid-
European countries, while at the bottom of the grid we find the south-European 
Greece and Portugal and developing countries like China, Brazil and India. 
 
 
 
Fig1 Source: World Management Survey website (www.worldmanagementsurvey.org) 
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Countries different management performance mirrors what are the cross-country 
productivity differences that have been analysed by Syverson and other authors. 
Though, this does not tell the whole story. In order to have a deeper insight of 
these patterns it is important to have also a look at what are the within country 
distributions. Fig.2 shows the average management scores per firm across the 
eighteen practices, plotted by country. 
 
 
Fig.2 Source: World Management Survey website (www.worldmanagementsurvey.org) 
 
Firms within countries display a great variation in management scores. The U.S 
show a distribution that is thicker on the right side, with almost no density of 
firms with management practices below two. This is reflecting its leading 
position in the inter-country score in Fig.1. Very similar performance is for 
English, German and Japanese companies. In comparison, countries like Greece 
and Portugal, India and Brazil, with the lowest cross-country management 
scores, perform a higher left tail of badly managed firms. 
The majority of these low scoring firms have only basic management styles, 
limited monitoring and targeting procedures and are poorly implementing 
incentive mechanisms. Finally, more compressed distributions show instead less 
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variation in managerial vintages and represent younger economies, as in the case 
of China. 
Of course these are average scores so that in fact countries differ by the adoption 
and specialization in some of these management practices. For instance, U.S 
companies are more likely to adopt targeting and incentive mechanisms, while 
European firms are more at ease with monitoring and shop floor operations. 
Latest data coming from the World Management Survey Project confirm that of 
the total firm-level variation in management only 11.7% is explained by country 
of location with the remaining 88.3% of within country heterogeneity. 
In order to have a taste of the kind of studies the project is piling up, I will below 
illustrate some of the major facts and figures. 
In the 2007 working paper the authors surveyed 732 medium-sized 
manufacturing firms in Europe and the United States combining econometric 
analysis with more detailed case studies. They took the following production 
function:  
 
€ 
yitc = α lc litc +αkckitc +αncnitc + βcMic + γ c 'Zitc + uitc  
 
with 
€ 
Y = deflated sales, 
€ 
L = labour, 
€ 
K = capital and 
€ 
N = intermediate inputs of 
firm 
€ 
i  at time 
€ 
t  in country 
€ 
c . Lower case letters represent natural logarithms 
while 
€ 
Z  other controls that affect productivity (workforce and firm 
characteristics and other industry and country dummies). 
To proxy management quality
€ 
M , each of the eighteen management practices 
takes z-score measure, average over all of the eighteen questions is taken and z-
scored so that the management index has a standard deviation of unity.   
Running OLS the evidence is of a significant and positive association between 
management score and total factor productivity, even when introducing control 
variables and firm effects to mitigate biases. 
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The same results hold when the dependent variable is ROCE (return on capital 
employed), as a measure for firm profitability, when it is Tobin's Q, the 
percentage of surviving firms, the annual growth rate of sales and firm size. 
 
Dependent 
variable  
Productivity Profits 
(ROCE) 
5 years-sales 
growth 
Exit 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS Probit 
Firm sample All All  Quoted All 
Management 23.3*** 1.952*** 6.738*** -26.2** 
Firms  2,927 2,927 2,927 3,161 
 
Fig.3 Source: World Management Survey (www.worldmanagementsurvey.org) 
 
In 2012, Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen show that the coefficient of 
the regression from a sample of 2927 manufacturing firms reveals that one point 
higher average management score is associated with 52 log points (69%) higher 
labor productivity, so that one standard deviation in management (of 0.664) 
means 45% increase in labor productivity, two percentage higher profitability, 
6.7% annual sales growth, and 1.1% reduction in exit rate.  
Together with manufacturing firms these regressions include also hospitals and 
schools. Here the dependent variables are respectively survival rates from 
emergency heart attack admissions in UK hospitals and students' achievements in 
secondary UK schools. Again the result are of a decrease of 0.471 points of a 
standard deviation in the risk-adjusted mortality rate and an increase of 0.196 
points of a standard deviation in students' test score for one-point increase in 
management score.  
In “Management as a technology?” (Bloom et al., 2013), performance 
regressions reveal that management score is associated with 35.5 log points 
higher labor productivity which reduces to 15.8 and to 3.0 when controlling for 
other variables and fixed effects but still remains positive and significant. 
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Moreover, a one-point increase in management quality is positively associated 
with size, ROCE, Tobin’s q, and negatively with the rate of exiting firms.  
The fact that management quality and firm performance go hand in hand can be 
also inferred by the regression of GDP per capita, as a measure reflecting TFP of 
a country, on management practices across a sample of 17 countries. The result is 
an R-squared of 0.81. Moreover, if we focus only on OECD countries the result 
lowers to 0.66 but still evidences the positive correlation. 
Besides the insights coming from these results, they are not explaining causality 
of the management scores on productivity. Indeed, the bias could be upward if, 
for example, greater financial resources enable the firm to invest in better 
management practices, instead, if better performance reduces managers’ efforts, 
the effect would be biased downwards.  
In order to check for causality a useful and growing method is to test theoretical 
hypothesis in laboratory and field experiments. In “Does management matter? 
Evidence from India” (Bloom et al., 2013), the group of authors run a field 
experiment in 28 plants across 17 textile Indian firms. Plants were randomly 
assigned to a treatment and a control group. Treatment plants received 
management consulting in 38, high scoring, management practices like setting 
targets, monitor performance and adopt incentive mechanisms, and were then 
compared to the control plants. The effects are telling: on average the treated 
plant cut defects by half, reduced inventory by 20% and raised output by 10%. 
The experimental evidence suggests that there is actually a set of practices that at 
least in one industry would be profitable, on average, for firms to adopt. 
Moreover, additional support to the management as a technology view is given 
by the analysis across industries of the coefficients of management showing that 
the management effect is the same across different sectors, while instead the 
coefficient for labor and capital are not stable across industries.   
Up to now what these studies evidence is that there is the need to acquire a 
deeper understanding on the reasons why in the same industry firms adopt 
different management practices, if the adoption actually raises productivity and 
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why it actually does (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2009). What the above findings 
teach us is that the approach of insider econometrics, and therefore firm 
experiments, is highly recommended. In particular, when the research explores a 
subset of practices that deal with workers management, and that in the 
management evaluation tool, developed by Bloom et al., would be comprised in 
the category “incentives”. These are mainly concerned with remuneration 
systems that promote and reward people based on performance and effort, the 
mechanisms of career advances, and of fixing/firing underperforming employees. 
Focusing only on the single impact of incentive mechanisms on firms’ 
performance, data gave the expected results of a positive and strong correlation 
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010a). The distribution of these people management 
practices across countries reflects the patterns displayed by the average 
management practices scores illustrated in Fig.1. Leading countries in the 
adoption of HR practices are U.S, Canada and Germany, while the lowest 
scoring are Portugal, Brazil and Greece.  
 
1.2  Insider Econometrics 
 
The typical approach to study the correlation between management practices and 
firms’ performance is, therefore, that of insider econometrics. There are several 
advantages that are worth to mention. First of all the observation is basically the 
“production unit”, which is either the single worker, a small group of employees, 
or a production line. This is very helpful since it reduces the omitted variables, 
allows to isolate the productivity effects and to build a specific measure for 
productivity.   
Depending on the study and on the treatment policy, the appropriate measure for 
productivity can obviously change.  Output per worker is only one possible 
observation. Other very interesting measures that are considered are worker 
absenteeism, product quality and production line downtime. 
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Shortly, I will describe a general picture of the treatment effect research methods 
of insider econometrics (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2009), used to analyse the 
response to innovative workers management practices, like in the one I 
mentioned above on Indian textile firms.  
The first step is to construct simple productivity regressions that allow estimating 
the treatment effect, i.e. the resulting effect if a firm and its workers adopt a new 
management practice or a group of it. Hence, the treatment effect can be 
considered as the productivity gain due to the adoption of a new management 
practice. At this point, the econometrician can be interested in estimating three 
different types of treatment effect: 
i. “The treatment of the treated effect” (TTE), i.e. the average effect on the 
treated group; 
ii. “The treatment of the non treated effect” (NTE), i.e. the expected value of 
the never-treated group; 
iii.  “The average treatment effect” (ATE), i.e. the average outcome if 
individuals are randomly assigned to a treatment group, which would 
eliminate the selections bias; 
In Bloom and Van Reenen (2010b), for instance, the authors take the following 
equation: 
 
€ 
yit = c +α idit + uit  
 
where 
€ 
y  is the potential outcome, like productivity, 
€ 
c  the common intercept, 
€ 
α  
represents the effect of the policy, 
€ 
d the treatment status at time 
€ 
t  and 
€ 
u  the 
error term.  Generally we are especially interested in estimating 
€ 
E(α i), the ATE, 
or 
€ 
E(α i d i =1), the TTE. 
Across the literature on firm studies which method is actually adopted depends 
whether the data are worker-level observations, often coming from personnel 
records of the firm, where treatment is randomly assigned to the worker. In this 
case what we are interested for is the estimation of the conditional average 
	  	   13	  
treatment effect (ATE). Instead, if we refer to group-level data, employee teams, 
production lines, stores and establishments across firms receive treatment of new 
management practices. Then the interest is in the TTE, the expected effect for the 
precise firm that adopts the treatment.  
If we introduce panel data in our study the error term takes the following form
€ 
uit =ηi +τ t +ε it , with 
€ 
ηi  worker’s specific fixed effect, 
€ 
τ i  the common time 
period effect and 
€ 
ε it , the transitory worker-specific effect. At this point there are 
two common options for estimating treatment effects in panel data.  
The simplest one is the First Differences method that allows to obtain:  
 
€ 
ˆ α TTE = Y post− t*1 −Y pre− t*1[ ]  
 
i.e. the difference in the conditional means of the treated group before and after 
the treatment. 
This method has several pitfalls as it does not consider control groups and 
therefore does not take into account unobservable time shocks and other controls. 
When the researcher owns instead longitudinal data on the treated and the control 
group, the Difference in Difference estimator allows measuring: 
 
€ 
ˆ α ATE = Y post− t*1 −Y pre− t*1[ ] − Y post− t*0 −Y pre− t*0[ ] 
 
which enables the sorting out of time and fixed effects for both groups. 
Nonetheless, insider studies are also subject to possible drawbacks, since issues 
of selection biases, endogeneity and omitted variables are a matter of discussion 
as well as the correct estimation of the production function. Moreover, it could 
be objected that each firm, like each worker, is optimizing costs and benefits and 
that management practices are contingent to the business environment they face. 
Though, actual evidence shows that the introduction of a specific set of HRM 
practices actually increases the productivity. Subsequently I will analyse in more 
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detail studies that adopt the described methods for the investigation of the impact 
of several human resources practices.  
 
1.3  Workplace Innovation 
 
In the paper “What’s driving the new economy: the benefits of workplace 
innovation”, Black and Lynch (2000) investigate what were the reasons of U.S. 
increase in productivity in the 90s. In particular, they focused on the role played 
by workplace innovation in a sample of manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
U.S. businesses over the years 1993-1996. 
They matched plant level practices with plant level productivity, using both 
cross-sectional and panel data. What they found is that the introduction of 
innovative and high performance practices, like profit sharing, stock options, 
higher involvement of workers in decision-making processes, regular group 
meetings were associated with increased productivity.  
Moreover, they found that workplace innovation was positively related also with 
IT knowledge and use within the firm and higher wages for workers.   
Their findings reveal another important aspect of how management matters. 
Indeed, the adoption of a new practice was mostly effective if it was associated 
with the implementation of other innovative practices. In their survey they 
underlined the role of unionization. Firms in which direct participation of 
workers in business decision-making is mostly encouraged and valued find that 
workplace innovation is more effective. 
Black and Lynch paper gives again the insight that the impact of a bundle of 
human resource practices will be greater than the sum of its parts because of the 
synergies acting between them. These insights give support to the view of 
management as a technology. In the next chapters I will analyse several studies 
where the introduction of a set of HR policies in a single firm reveals a positive 
effect on performances and in particular on workers’ productivity.  
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For the moment, within general HRM practices, I will focus my attention on the 
effects of incentive pay schemes. In the last thirty years the adoption of 
performance pay has increased dramatically. In working paper of Lazear and 
Shaw (2007), the authors describe the adoption path of incentive pay by firms 
from 1987 to 1999, showing that more than 20% of the employees that work with 
a form of individual incentive, like performance bonus, has grown from 38 
percent to 67 percent. Compensation systems that include group bonuses, like 
gain sharing, has grown as well from 26 percent to 53 percent.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Incentive contracts 
 
In order to understand how incentives work within an organization I will shortly 
describe the classic agency theory based on Holmström model. This, together 
with the tournament theory, provides a general model and the ground for further 
discussion and for the analysis of field experiments on the impact of incentives 
on workers’ behaviour (Levinthal, 1988). The theory behind incentives is very 
complex and it is far from being only a matter of tradeoffs between incentives 
and insurance. In the case of pay-for-performance, for instance, studies show that 
individuals are willing to accept to bear higher risks when these efforts are highly 
rewarded. It exists a great variety of incentive types of contracts and I will focus 
on financial incentives in particular, first by giving the insights out of this theory 
and afterwards by showing the results of empirical research.  
The standard agency theory tells us that there is a principal that seeks to elicit a 
certain action from an agent, his employee, so as to maximize his objective 
function that can be represented by output 
€ 
y . The agent can take action 
€ 
a  so as 
to produce the output 
€ 
y = a +ε  where 
€ 
ε  is the noise term that represents any kind 
of events that are beyond the agent’s control. Thus, the cumulative distribution of 
output conditional to 
€ 
a  will be represented by 
€ 
F y a( ). 
This problem reveals the underlining conflicting goals of the individuals 
involved; the principal aims at maximizing his outcome at the lowest costs while 
the agent wants to maximize his revenues at the lowest efforts. Indeed, incentive 
issues arise because of divergent goals, in addition to incomplete information, as 
I will illustrate below. 
The principal owns the output but decides to share it with the agent and offers, 
for example, a linear wage contract 
€ 
w = s+ by , where the intercept 
€ 
s is the fixed 
salary and the slope  represents the bonus rate. The agent seeks to maximize his 
payoff, 
€ 
u w( ) − c a( ), where 
€ 
u w( )  is the concave utility function, hence, assuming 
! 
b
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the agent is risk-adverse, while 
€ 
c a( )  is the convex cost function or the disutility 
of effort. The principal, instead, wants to maximize 
€ 
v y − w( ). 
This represents a basic risk-sharing problem and can be solved by backward 
induction. First of all we find the agent best response 
€ 
a* to the contract offered 
by the principal, assuming he accepts the job position. Given agent’s best 
response we have to find the contract that maximizes the principal objective.  
 
The principal wants to maximize the following function: 
 
€ 
v y − w y( )( )dF y a( )∫  
 
subject to the following constraints: 
 
1) 
€ 
u w y( )( ) − c a( )[ ]dF y a( ) ≥ ˆ U ∫  
 
2) 
€ 
a* = Argmax u w y( )[ ] − c a( )dF y a( )∫  
 
The first constraint reflects the fact that the principal has to offer an expected 
utility of at least 
€ 
ˆ U . The second constraint shows that the agent maximizes his 
utility function and, assuming 
€ 
F  differentiable, 
€ 
a* can be represented with the 
first-order condition of his objective function: 
 
€ 
u w y( )( ) fa y a( )dy = c' a( )∫  
 
At this point we can set the Lagrangian and take 
€ 
λ  and 
€ 
µ  as the multipliers of 
the participation constraint and the best-response constraint respectively. 
The result will be the following, also known as the optimal sharing rule:  
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€ 
v' y − w y( )[ ]
u' w y( )[ ]
= λ + µ
fa y a( )
f y a( )
 
 
On the left-hand side we have the ratio of the marginal utilities for the principal 
and the agent. Instead, on the right-hand side, we find 
€ 
λ , the Lagrange multiplier 
for the agent’s participation constraint plus a multiplier for the incentive 
constraint, 
€ 
µ , times the marginal effect of effort on the likelihood of obtaining 
output 
€ 
y , scaled by the likelihood of obtaining that 
€ 
y . The output for which 
€ 
fa y a( )
f y a( )
 is large is indicative of higher effort.  
Therefore, if generally higher effort is associated with greater results, the 
principal seeks to find the optimal compensation scheme that acts as an incentive 
for the agent and aligns to his interests. In the case in which the MLRP 
(monotonic likelihood ratio property) holds and 
€ 
fa y a( )
f y a( )
 is an increasing function 
of the outcome, then the principal, who cannot observe the agent’s action, will 
offer payment schemes that increase agent’s effort. Unfortunately, considering 
the linear work contract 
€ 
w = s+ by , a steeper slope 
€ 
b creates greater incentives 
but it increases also the risk the agent has to bear, lowering his marginal utility 
and driving to inefficiencies. Since individuals are risk-averse and pay for 
performance offers a rather uncertain income, the solution to the problem usually 
represents a second-best one.  
Moreover, outcome is not only the result of agent’s effort; uncertainty and 
incomplete information are also important factors to be considered. In this kind 
of problem, uncertainty is not only represented by the noise term but, from the 
point of view of the principal, it refers also to the inability to know about the 
actions the agent chooses (moral hazard) and about the characteristics of the 
agent (self-selection).   
If the principal could in fact directly observe labor inputs, a first-best solution to 
the contract would be possible. Hence the principal, like the agent, are subject to 
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some degree of risk and uncertainty and usually we observe second-best 
compensation schemes, which still provide incentives to work but at the expenses 
of taking some degree of risk.   
Therefore, it is very difficult to find the optimal level of incentives, since many 
variables are not observable and usually contracts are difficult to induce agents’ 
actions to match the social marginal benefits of the firm (Gibbons, 1988).  
If we consider further developments of agency theory that analyses multitask 
problems we have the counterintuitive evidence, verified also by tournament 
theory, that weaker incentives are in some settings more efficient than stronger 
ones. As Lazear ans Shaw (2007) point out, strong incentives can cause higher 
efforts but also the risk of sabotage. In order to find an optimal solution to the 
problem we should reveal all the variables having the label “total firm value” and 
consider for all the actions available to agents, usually an impossible task. 
According to this approach the efficient prize level has to be consequently lower. 
Paraphrasing Baker, creating strong incentives for the wrong actions is useless, 
and a shirking and cheating behaviour of the employee can still arise.  
Firms often respond to this problem by introducing monitoring schemes, though, 
because of the heterogeneity of agents, its impact is difficult to assess. 
An important lesson, related to the issue of incomplete information and 
information asymmetries, is that performance measurement becomes of 
paramount importance (Baker, 1992). The principal’s objective function may be 
mostly different from the performance required by the agent. Few organizations, 
in fact, have clear and verifiable objectives that can be used directly for the 
design of incentive contracts. Total firm value contains too many variables and it 
doesn’t provide an appropriate guide to agent’s action. How to align the value of 
the firm with the performance of the worker is a central issue in agency theory. 
Indeed, the size of optimal piece rate and the type of work contract closely 
depend on the relationship between the measure of performance of the worker 
and firm’s objective function. Baker (1992), for instance, provides useful insights 
for determining optimal linear incentive contracts. Namely, “when the marginal 
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product of the agent’s actions on thàùe performance measure is highly correlated 
with the marginal product of these actions on the principal’s objective, then the 
performance measure is a good one and the resulting contract will be efficient. If 
not, the resulting contract will induce outcomes that significantly diverge from 
the first-best”. The issue of performance measurement is highly significant and 
can determine the kind of compensation systems. Hence the theory would predict 
that where there is the possibility to measure the right outcomes, bonus and 
commission-based contracts tend to dominate. Instead, when no good 
performance measures exist, we observe straight salary systems.  
Given the limits of objective performance measurement and the complexity of 
worker’s contribution to firm’s performance, there are some authors that examine 
the possibility of a subjective performance assessment. The introduction of 
relational contracts in terms of subjective bonuses, combined with more formal 
contracts, has shown to have a positive consequence on reducing distortions. 
Moreover, they are important devices because they increase the agent’s 
compensations as well as the possibility to continue their tenure within the firm. 
Of course, the more career and reputation concerns the greater will be the impact 
of these implicit contracts. As outlined in Prendergast (1996), for example, 
managers close to retirement have more explicit contracts in which rewards are 
closely tied to performance because the reputation issue is less important.  
As the theory points out, the problems companies face with organizational design 
and personnel policies are manifold. In order to evaluate the effects of incentive 
contracts on workers’ behaviour the theory needs complementary studies, 
represented by field and laboratory experiments that are able to address the key 
theoretical questions and advance in the empirical implications of these theories.   
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2.1 Monetary incentives in field experiments: The economists demand, 
firms respond 
 
An assessment of the theory is found already in several laboratory experiments 
but as I already explained, their results might be corroborated by more empirical 
research in the form of real field experiments. These investigate the actual impact 
of real incentive contracts and of human resources practices within firms, in 
general. Economists have examined the incentive effects in particular for simple 
jobs where measurement is more affordable. These studies vary the incentive pay 
plans within firms and have the advantage of controlling for endogeneity in the 
choice of compensation. The majority of these studies evidence a positive impact 
on workers’ behaviour. 
The first theoretical subject we consider is the choice of incentive practices that 
include bonuses and performance pay and how these are related to productivity. 
The fact that there is an increasing number of firms that pay on the basis of 
workers’ performance can be due to more available personnel data and less 
costly methods of output measurement. These reasons are very important for 
firms’ optimal choice between “pay for the input” and “pay for the output”.  
One of the most interesting studies on incentive pay is found in Lazear (2000) 
who looked at a data set coming from Safelite Glass Corporations, a large 
American auto-glass company in which workers install automobile windshields. 
In 1994 the Safelite management decided to substitute workers’ fixed hourly 
wages with a piece rate payment schedule. Safelite possesses a very powerful 
information system and this allowed a before and after comparison data on about 
3000 workers and observations over a period of 19 months.  
Lazear evidences that the implemented piece-rate scheme had a strong incentive 
effect on workers’ effort and increased the average levels of output per worker, 
confirming theoretical predictions. Furthermore it shows an increase in the 
average level of workers’ ability. In fact the data reflect that jobs where the pay 
is related to output are more attractive for high-quality workers and determine a 
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shift in the composition of the workforce. This sorting effect shows to be the 
result mainly of the hiring process and there is less evidence of an impact on 
lower productivity workers; they just maintain the same effort level and they 
don’t leave the firm. Henceforth, a change to a compensation scheme that is 
based on pay-for-performance shows to result in an increase and in a higher 
dispersion of effort and output through incentive and selection effects. 
However, the study presents an imperilment for any kind of generalization. 
Indeed, the piece rates were introduced with a guaranteed minimum salary equal 
to the hourly wage under the original regime. In this way the employee perceived 
the new payment system like an opportunity for an improvement in pay, ensuring 
equal or higher pay. Thus, Lazear’s work excludes observations on how risk 
aversion determines individuals’ preferences and final sorting and incentive 
effects.  
Several laboratory experiments confirm in fact the predictive value of the theory 
regarding risk-aversion. In a laboratory setting the feature of risk aversion is 
more likely to be measured and we can control for its impact on individuals’ 
preferences over compensation schemes. For example, the result of an 
experiment run by Cadsby et al. (2007) shows that risk attitudes can play an 
important role: incentive and sorting effects are weaker for more risk averse 
individuals and sorting effects account even greater for workers’ productivity 
differentials than in the Lazear study. 
However, a much better response on how risk-aversion matters for the 
determination of optimal incentive instruments is given in the case of incentives 
in the form of stock options. Oyer and Shaefer (2004) study offers information 
on the incidence of granted stock options across the U.S. economy, based on data 
of 1999.  Stock options subject the worker to a considerable amount of risk 
because it links his revenues to the value of the firm.  
The authors used data on stock option plans for middle mangers in a sample of 
200 firms. They calibrated an agency model to data and found that the risk 
premium associated with these grants is several orders of magnitude larger than 
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the employee’s cost of increased effort. Middle-managers options provide 
incentives to increase efforts only under specific circumstances, like in the case 
in which employees’ actions have a strong impact on firm value but at a very 
little cost and in the case in which employees’ action is not perfectly traceable. 
Therefore, in their opinion, the incentive model cannot account for the primary 
justification of option plans. On the contrary, sorting and retention effects are 
positively related to the adoption of these instruments. In particular in the case of 
optimistic employees who are willing to accept reductions in cash compensations 
for option-based pay packages.  
Options may also help firms to retain employees because they increase the 
employees’ cost of leaving the firm or because the options help to index wages to 
the labor market conditions. In fact the more volatile the industry the higher 
would be renegotiations costs of spot wages and the incentives for employees to 
accept outside options. Therefore options are intended to track wage variations.  
Attraction and retention benefits are also confirmed by the higher diffusion of 
options granting among smaller firms, with more volatile returns or with negative 
cash flows. 
Shearer (2004) proposed another well-known field experiment that studies 
monetary incentives in a Canadian tree-planting firm.  
The firm under analysis usually applies a piece rate form of compensation. 
Workers are paid on the basis of the planted trees and piece rates change 
according to the planting conditions. The goal of the experiment was to measure 
the change in worker’s effort when changing to a fixed wage compensation 
system. A group of nine planters was randomly selected to take part to the 
experiment. Workers were randomly assigned to three different block sites and 
each block was divided into two “compensation regions”: one with a fixed wage, 
the other one with a piece rate payment. Workers were observed under both 
compensation systems over a total period of observation of 120 planting days.  
The author calculated the incentive effect on individual 
€ 
i  in block 
€ 
j  as the 
weighted average percentage increase:  
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The study reveals that when the workers were assigned to a compensation 
scheme with piece rates, they increased their average productivity of 21%, 
compared to the case in which they were working under fixed wages. Moreover, 
the author registered an increased variance of output and higher workers’ 
earnings.   
The relevance of this paper relies also on the formulated structural model that 
helps to generalize the incentive effect beyond the experimental circumstances. 
Indeed, the data provide the structural parameters, which govern when worker’s 
effort changes as conditions change. The estimation of these parameters can then 
provide generalizations of incentives effects outside the experimental 
circumstances showing the potential of small-scale experiments within firms.  
Practice can therefore provide very significant insights for the theory, though 
some limitations still remain. Specifically, the study covers a short period of time 
and it doesn’t offer information about the labor market. Moreover, it doesn’t 
identify monitoring practices and hence we have no clues on how these could 
affect the incentives mechanisms.  
In Lazear and Shearer field experiments the objective of the firm and the 
productivity of workers were very simple to measure and the relation between 
incentives and firm’s performance is straightforward, leaving no doubts on the 
effects and causality relation between management practice and performance. 
These results are in line with the standard theory assumption that greater 
incentives lead to higher efforts and productivity. Though, as we already have 
analysed in the theoretical background, in several interesting experiments, 
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workers’ response to incentive may deviate from expectations driving to moral 
hazard and sabotage.  
On this latter issue, Nagin et al. (2002) conducted a field experiment on 
employees of a non-profit organization that earn a piece rate wage, based on the 
number of donations they can stipulate with phone-calls. Since the payment 
system created an incentive also for moral hazard, the firm engaged in an 
experiment designed to see for the effects of monitoring processes (call-backs) 
and punishment measures. If the “suspicious bad call” (SBC) was actually false, 
it was deducted from pay. The data show that when monitoring is low, moral 
hazard increases and in the cross-employee distribution, at 90th percentile, 
workers are cheating 15 times more as the median employee.  The lesson we 
draw from these results is that firms can reduce their monitoring costs by 
restricting them on those individuals that are more likely to cheat.  
Nagin research paper drives my discussion also to another important matter 
within these innovating payment systems, namely, the trade-off between quantity 
and quality. On one side monetary incentives drive to more productivity in terms 
of output per worker (quantity), on the other side the threat of a quality fall has to 
be considered as an additional cost when implementing piece rates. Finding the 
optimal compensation system means finding “the appropriate compensation 
formula that will induce workers to put forth the right amount of effort towards 
quantity and quality”, as pointed out in Lazaer (1995). Moreover the author 
underlines as well that “with a sufficient expected penalty it is possible to have a 
piece rate that increases quantity while maintaining and even improving quality”. 
Similar to the findings of Nagin et al., Freeman and Kleiner (2005) field 
experiment in a shoe manufacturing firm shows that in fact when the firm shifted 
from piece rates to time rates, it registered an increase in quality levels and 
profits at the expense of a productivity decrease. The reason is that hourly wages 
reduced the costs related to quality measurement and monitoring by enough to 
offset a fall in productivity.  
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Mixing results come from field experiments in which pay for performance is 
applied to teachers on the basis of their students learning outcomes.  
Glewee and Kremer (2003) provide group incentives, based on students’ test 
scores, to primary school teachers in Kenya. They find that test scores went up in 
the short run but the students did not retain the gains after the end of the 
incentive program. Quality is reduced because teachers specialize only on the 
rewarded tasks.  
Therefore incentives should go hand in hand with appropriate monitoring 
practices and fines in order to improve quality at the least expenses of workers’ 
productivity. 
A series of case studies run by Fernie and Metcalf (1998) stress the importance 
of monitoring devices in the adoption of pay for performance. Their research 
focused on the contractual arrangements in call centres of four different 
organizations operating in the service sector. It is a very interesting study among 
the panorama of empirical research on incentives because most field experiments 
look at production processes within the manufacturing industry. They found that 
although the occupations were similar, the payment systems were varying 
substantially. Their primary explanation for these differences in payment lies in 
the relative costs and benefits of monitoring inputs with respect to measuring 
outputs.  Companies that focus more on the measurement of output will be more 
likely to choose pay for performance compensations. In the case in which inputs 
have greater importance and the management is more concerned in monitoring 
the quality of calls and the agent behaviour, then hourly wages will dominate. 
These results show that our analysis should not limit the explanation for the 
choice in types of compensation to measurement costs and means, as outlined by 
the theory. On the contrary, we should develop a more complete understanding 
on what the firm puts the most value and is willing to invest for.  
The importance of monitoring for the design of more efficient compensation 
plans is also checked in another important experiment that is concerned with the 
introduction of incentive pay schemes on managers.  
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Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2011) recently ran series of experiments from 
2002 to 2005 in a UK fruit-picking farm, where all managers were observed 
under two types of payment treatment. Each manager decides how much effort to 
exert and how to allocate it among workers. Incentive payment was introduced in 
the form of an initial paid flat rate plus a subsequent payment related to the 
productivity of the managed workers. The average worker’s productivity 
increased by 21% and was more dispersed among workers. This was for a large 
part the result of a selection effect: the most able workers were more likely to be 
employed by the general manager, who is responsible for the workers’ daily 
assignment to the fields.  Moreover, field managers targeted their efforts towards 
more able workers driving to a “targeting effect”. The firm induced managers to 
focus more on higher ability workers from whom they obtained the greatest 
marginal effect. Nevertheless it induced also managers to adopt closer 
monitoring, limiting the negative effects of shirking behaviour.  
 
2.2 Implicit and explicit incentives in lab experiments 
 
Field experiments have the advantage to investigate the human motivation 
directly in the economic context. In the above experiments we want to 
understand how individual incentives should be designed in order to drive 
workers’ motivation and action towards better performance so as to align 
individuals and company’s interests. Still, this represents a very limited and 
narrow view. The production process has a social dimension that cannot be 
overlooked and more complex individuals’ psychological traits are at work. For 
these reasons there are other aspects to be considered when we analyse human 
behaviour in response to incentives and laboratory experiments offer a 
complementary way to undertake research in this area. 
In “Psychological Foundations of Incentives”, Fehr and Falk (2002) consider 
social preferences as an important aspect of human behaviour.  
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Social preferences are described as the care individuals have for material 
resources allocated to others, in particular to a reference agent. In the principal-
agent model the principal would represent this reference person. 
The authors define three main social preferences: the preference for reciprocity, 
the desire for social approval and the enjoyment and desire to work on specific 
tasks. 
Many studies and laboratory experiments confirm the important role played by 
these motives and show that they guide individuals’ behaviour and interact with 
the economic incentives. 
For what concerns reciprocity, the authors illustrate an experiment (Fehr et al., 
1997) on an employment contract that shows that when the principal is making a 
job offer that is more remunerative for the agents, on average workers respond 
with a higher effort level. 
In this manner the principal elicits a reciprocal response from the worker and 
induces a voluntary cooperation. In a following experiment Fehr and Gächter 
(2001) looked at the interaction of voluntary cooperation with monetary 
incentives. Given the same model they introduced two different treatments. One 
treatment applies a fine in the form of a wage deduction in the case of shirking 
behaviour. The other treatment provides instead a positive incentive in the form 
of a bonus payment. The bonus will not be paid if shirking is verified. Therefore 
the two treatments, the positively and the negatively framed, have the same 
expected loss in the case of shirking behaviour.  
However, the results from the experiment show that in the case of the negatively 
framed incentive in average workers reduce the level of voluntary cooperation 
and perform a much lower level of effort than in the case of no explicit 
incentives. Relatively to the baseline model, the negative incentive induces also 
lower effort and reduced surplus, but increases the principal profits. When the 
treatment is the application of a positive incentive, instead, effort and voluntary 
cooperation are increasing. Hence, the framing of the incentive is highly 
significant because of its psychological implications and because it shapes 
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worker’s perceptions. Whether the agent perceives the incentive as hostile or 
kind is determinant for his response in terms of effort.  
Fehr et al. (2001) extend these experiments by monitoring the responses related 
to different types of performance payment, in particular to bonus rates and to 
linear piece rates, in order to solve the problem of multiple tasks. If we consider 
only selfish subjects the piece rate contract will be always chosen but agents’ 
effort will be not optimally distributed among tasks since agents will always put 
effort on the performance related to the piece rate. On the contrary, under a 
bonus payment system, if the principals are reciprocal then they can induce 
agents to allocate the effort efficiently across tasks and to provide non-minimal 
effort levels. 
These results show that when contracts are left vague and they don’t tie the 
parties’ monetary payoffs to measures of performance they produce implicit 
material incentives, i.e. not based on contractual terms, provided that the parties 
have reciprocal preferences.  
Fehr and Falk’s conclusions are that, generally, contracts based on positively 
framed incentives produce implicit incentives and are more effective.  
Another important motive that drives individuals’ behaviour and interacts with 
the material incentives is individuals’ desire for social approval. 
Rege and Telle (2001) and Gächter and Fehr (1999) provide experiments where 
individuals’ contributions to a public good are observed in the case of anonymity 
and in the case in which the other participants know each contribution. 
Contributions raise twice as much in the second case confirming that individuals 
avoid social disapproval from their group members.  
Fehr and Gächter (2001) and Carpenter (2001) provide similar experiments but 
they add a material incentive, namely the punishment of free riders. This material 
incentive not only reduces free riders’ income but it also subjects them to social 
disapproval. 
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If the punishment opportunity is introduced the experiments show that almost 
full cooperation can be achieved. Henceforth we can state that economic 
incentives and approval incentives may reinforce each other.  
The argument is more complex if we consider that multiple equilibria can arise 
because the behaviour of one individual is tied to the behaviour of others and 
therefore his approval incentive changes if the average contribution to the public 
good is high or low. If we have for example a stable high-compliance 
equilibrium individuals will naturally converge to it.  
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) propose a few experiments where they 
demonstrate that material incentives can sometimes weaken the approval 
incentives. In one of their experiments, the introduction of a fine to parents that 
arrive late for picking up their children at the kindergarten instead of being an 
incentive for arriving on time it induces parents to arrive late because the fine 
cancels the moral and social disapproval from the school principal.  
In another experiment they propose a monetary incentive for children voluntary 
work. The introduction of monetary rewards in fact reduces the approval rewards 
children benefit when they collect donations for research societies on diseases 
and for charities.  
The authors believe that monetary incentives for adopting moral behaviour or for 
converging to a social norm actually reduces individuals’ commitment and can 
also drive to the opposite effect. Moral behaviour is in fact considered likewise 
because it is not induced by any material incentive. 
The last social preference that Fehr and Falk discuss in their review is 
represented by the intrinsic motivation that drives individual behaviour and acts 
like an incentive. Economists want to test how intrinsic motivation interacts with 
other types of explicit incentives. Deci (1971) proposed an experiment in which 
individuals were divided in a control and a treatment group and they were 
observed during three phases in which they had to make puzzles. Only in phase 2 
they were paid for their activity. 
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The observer exited the room during all phases for a short period and observed 
from outside. Intrinsic motivation was measured when the individuals continued 
to perform the activity irrespectively from the observer and the pay.  
This experiment evidences another salient psychological trait. During the last 
phase the treatment group reduces the most its engagement in the puzzle activity. 
This may because the payment in phase 2 has a crowding out effect of the 
intrinsic motivation. Indeed explicit incentives can, under given conditions, 
reduce the task specific intrinsic motivation.  
Finally, the withdrawal of the reward in phase 3 has also a disappointment effect. 
In economic terms, as soon individuals experience an extrinsic incentive, if the 
incentive is removed their marginal disutility of effort will be higher and the 
intrinsic motivation is undermined.  
From the series of field and laboratory experiments I have described we learn 
that incentives matter and generally they induce employees to improve their 
efforts. There exist material and more explicit incentives types, like pay for 
performance, and there exist implicit incentives, which have significant 
implications for the actual behaviour of workers. 
The final result will be given by the interaction of these incentives. Nevertheless 
we can make some important conclusions: piece rates incentive workers to 
improve their output and select the more able workers into production; the more 
agents are risk-averse the more it will be efficient to introduce weaker incentives; 
considering multitask agency theory, incentives should be introduced together 
with monitoring and punishment arrangements in order to hinder the wrong 
actions, avoid distortions and address the agents’ efforts to the desired outcomes.  
Nonetheless, the empirical research represents mostly easy-to-measure aspects of 
employee performance and the majority of experiments deals with the 
introduction of piece rates into compensation systems. The workplace is a much 
more complex environment and the success of a contract depends on several 
variables. The laboratory experiments showed in fact the impact of implicit 
incentives and how they enhance workers’ performance in the form of voluntary 
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cooperation, compliance with a social norm, and greater motivation. Material 
incentives can either stimulate these implicit incentives or have a crowding out 
effect. 
However, individual monetary incentives are not the only types of contracts. 
Camerer and Weber (2007) give us a measure of the range of possibilities for the 
firm in the design of optimal incentives contracts. The authors offer a very 
comprehensive review of the available empirical research, including field and 
laboratory experiments, and highlight the importance of the social dimension of 
the workplace. Production has in most work settings a collective nature. A given 
outcome necessitates the interaction of several skills as well as the 
complementarities of heterogeneous types of knowledge and human capital. 
Therefore it becomes very appealing to investigate compensation structures like 
gain sharing, profit sharing, group incentives and stock ownership. 
The literature on empirical research on the latter forms of contracts offers 
divergent results on the actual incentive effects for workers’ performance. 
However, the latest nationally representative survey for US establishments 
reveals that 52% of firms use teamwork, while the corresponding survey for 
British establishments shows that in 47% of firms more than 90% of the 
workforce is organized in teams (Bandiera et al. 2013). In my opinion team 
incentives and shared types of compensation represent very challenging subjects 
to discuss and I will further investigate it in the following chapter. I will show 
that these new types of HRM practices are already well established among the 
Anglo-Saxon countries and that they are gaining momentum also in the European 
economy. They are promising to be growing among worldwide corporations and 
they will concern the more and more workers. For these reasons it becomes very 
interesting to understand how these practices work and how they can determine 
the competitiveness of a company. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Shared Capitalism 
 
Pay for performance practices, in the form of individual piece rates and bonuses, 
are successful tools in the hands of companies’ management and are extensively 
used. Nevertheless they represent only a small fraction within the possible 
personnel management practices that lead to better firms’ performance and 
growth.  
Team-based payment systems are gaining strength as well, and several surveys, 
which I will analyse, show that an increased number of firms introduced 
incentives like team bonuses. 
In workplaces where individuals’ productivity is linked to the work of other 
individuals, individual incentives are less desirable. If on one hand they drive the 
individual to higher efforts, on the other it induces also to a more individualistic, 
less communicative and cooperative type of production. Moreover, if we 
consider individuals’ social preference for social approval, a piece rate regime 
may have an effect of withholding efforts. As expressed in Fehr and Falk (2002), 
a worker’s greater effort would harm his colleagues who would subject him to 
social disapproval and consider his behaviour as free riding.  Since firms’ 
production represents a very complex process that involves inter-workers 
synergies and a high degree of social connections, individual incentives apply 
better to very low-skill and simple production processes.  
On the contrary, when we talk about group incentives we do not only refer to 
bonuses given to organized teams based on their collective performance, but we 
can also consider the overall firm’s production. Therefore, group incentives do 
not only include gain sharing but also profit sharing, stock ownership, and other 
compensation schemes where the pay or the wealth of workers is directly tied to 
the firm’s overall performance. 
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Bloom and Van Reenen document the rise of these types of payment practices 
across industries in the last 30 years and confirm that about half of the employees 
in private US and UK companies participate in collective payment schemes.  
Incentive compensation systems that give workers the opportunity to reap the 
benefits of collective production are categorized under the label of shared 
capitalism practices. 
In Freeman et al. (2010) shared capitalism refers to “a diverse set of 
compensation practices through which the worker pay or wealth depends on the 
performance of the firm or work group.”  
The building block model for incentives already provides an insight into the 
benefits of this innovative management system. In complex production processes 
information is incomplete and it is difficult to measure the marginal product of 
each worker. Hence when we consider the overall output of the firm, the quantity 
and the quality produced, incentives are more effective when applied on a 
collective scale.  
Of course group incentives may also be ineffective, create distortions and even 
reduce productivity.   For instance when they stimulate workers to free ride and 
when workers have a weak impact on productivity changes. Moreover, when 
worker’s revenues are linked to the productivity of other workers, or even to the 
performance of their employer, risk increases, displacing the effectiveness of the 
incentive. This is the case of employee stock ownership and the previously cited 
paper of Oyer and Shaefer (2004) is an illustrative work that describes the related 
negative aspects of risk aversion. 
Side effects a part, many big corporations are adopting shared capitalism 
practices, usually in the form of financial share plans. They represent high 
involvement management tools and research findings show higher labor 
productivity in the presence of such plans.  
Freeman et al. offer a very representative review on shared capitalism practices 
and they show that they are in general positively associated with company’s 
performance. Based on a NBER survey and on the General Social Survey of 
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2002 and 2006, the authors investigate the adoption of shared capitalism by US 
companies and they obtain data on a sample of 40,000 workers in fourteen 
different companies, across 323 worksites. 
The results of their study show that shared capitalism practices are widespread 
through the US economy and they have a strong effect on workers’ behaviour. 
More specifically, the authors find the following positive workplace outcomes: 
lower turnover and absenteeism, greater worker loyalty to the firm; increased 
workers’ willingness to work hard for the firm and a higher frequency of 
suggestions coming from the workers in order to improve efficiency in the 
production process.  
The main HRM arrangements that are analysed by the authors are employee 
stock ownership, profit sharing, gain sharing and stock options. 
Running OLS, in average terms, these practices have a positive association with 
productivity, innovativeness and workers’ wellbeing. Shared capitalism aims and 
promotes a higher level of workers’ involvement into production and boosts to 
higher performance.  
The research paper made by Freeman et al. offers a very representative study on 
the shared capitalism practices in the American economy, but how about Europe? 
There are several studies that describe the situation among European countries. 
Based on the Pepper IV Report of 2009 and on other surveys, like the European 
Working Condition Survey of 2005, findings show that employee financial 
participation practices are widespread also among large European companies and 
they have been growing in the last 20-30 years.  
In the rest of my work, I will examine these management methods plus lower 
scale team incentives, showing their drawbacks and their potential. My interest 
will be mainly concentrated on how shared capitalism is connected to 
companies’ better performance, in the variability of its actual success and in the 
synergies between these HRM practices.  
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3.1 Teams and Team Incentives 
 
The introduction of teams belongs to the new set of human resource management 
strategies. These high-involvement practices prove to be linked to increased 
firm’s performance and workers’ effort. Companies use teamwork in order to 
induce more workers’ commitment. Indeed teamwork delegates greater 
responsibilities to the workers and involves them directly in decision-making 
processes.  
The management decision to introduce teamwork comes in response to more 
complex production processes where the interaction of different skills and the 
contribution of diverse types of knowledge are highly valued. The same happens 
within companies in the industry for new technologies where the production 
needs very specialised knowledge. Employees are acting in concert and the 
coordination of their skills is of paramount importance for the best overall 
outcome.  
The theory already predicts the positive impact of teams. Indeed, by increasing 
employees’ discretion and with a more decentralized structure of decision-
making and responsibilities, the problem of information asymmetry is weakened.  
Moreover, implicit incentives are activated when greater decision power is 
distributed to the single worker. As Fehr and Falk demonstrated in their article, 
employees feel rewarded and increase the intrinsic motivation to work, they feel 
the necessity to reciprocate and increase voluntary cooperation. The authors 
showed also that individuals look for social approval and within a team the 
approval incentive might be strengthened, as workers’ performance becomes 
directly observable by other team members.  
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence about the actual effectiveness of teams 
shows divergent results. On one side teams do improve employees’ commitment, 
their productivity and enhance also the quality of the final product. On the other 
side the reorganization of production in teams implies high implementation costs, 
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which are not immediately compensated by the productivity gains of the new 
strategy, and the risk to incentive workers to free-riding behaviour. 
Jones et al. (2010) propose a research where they examine changes in the HRM 
practices in a Finnish food-processing plant between 1999-2005. The authors 
focused on the productivity consequences of the introduction of teams, profit 
sharing plans, and performance related payment systems across four different 
production lines, holding the technology and the production methods unaltered.  
The key performance measure is the “efficiency score”, calculated by actual 
production divided over a production standard. This measure looks therefore at 
the production capacity of the line with respect to fixed standards.  
The results appear to diverge depending on the production lines. In mechanized 
work processes, for instance, the opportunity to increase employees’ 
performance is greater than in more manual processes, like the line for meat 
reception. In the latter the new HRM strategy has no positive gains. 
Moreover, very interesting is that the greatest result took place when the firm 
introduced to teams also pay for performance practices, which led to a 
performance improvement between 9 and 20%. 
In the experiment team performance payment was in fact implemented after 
teams had been operational for three years. In most of the production lines the 
performance improvements are realized only after team rewards had been 
introduced. Consequently we can affirm that companies don’t produce significant 
gains in productivity if the adoption of teams is not paired with performance-
related compensation schemes. This suggests that employees are less committed 
to innovating work processes unless they receive a reward for it.  
Additionally, teams act like autonomous entities within the company and they are 
likely to produce complete outputs, hence monetary incentives may be designed 
on the basis of their group production. Incentives for teams are therefore 
complementary instruments to the introduction of teamwork. 
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These results are also consistent with the complementarity argument; the most 
significant gains for the firm arrive when several human resource management 
practices are matched together.  
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) propose a similar experiment for a 
garment factory in California. This experiment highlights how the introduction of 
teamwork coupled with group incentives can affect the average productivity.  
Employees involved in the sewing activity were observed under individual and 
group related payment schemes. The impact of teams on average productivity 
was estimated with OLS and the results of the experiment show a substantial and 
upward change under the group piece rate system in 14 of the 23 observed teams. 
The panel data estimates suggest that in addition to the incentive effect there is 
also an important contribution coming from the selection effect. Teams are in 
fact attracting higher-ability workers and have a positive effect in reducing 
turnover. Indeed workers are less likely to leave the company, because of the 
non-pecuniary benefits they now receive at their workplace. 
These findings also confirm the hypothesis that the interaction between different 
skills and workers’ collaboration increase shared knowledge and has an upward 
pressure on the production capacity. Indeed heterogeneity in workers’ ability 
might have an important role because of the knowledge transfer among team 
members. High-quality employees have a greater bargaining power that allows 
enforcing a high-productivity norm within the team. At the same time low-ability 
workers are benefiting from the mutual learning and knowledge sharing. 
The combination of these effects appear to offset the possible free-riding, 
predicted by the moral hazard model, that constitutes the primary concern when 
the activity is organized into teams and payment is linked to the group output. 
Group members are in fact incentivised to rather decrease their efforts because of 
the costs related to any additional contribution and because they receive only a 
share of the accrued benefits from any extra effort. Hence, from a purely 
financial point of view, the employee will rationally undertake extra efforts only 
if the costs are less than the extra bonus he can expect. However, as 
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demonstrated from the experimental findings of Hamilton et al. and generally in 
the available literature, the design of a team based production and payment 
system allows and eases the peer-monitoring activity so that at least productivity 
cannot decrease. Group rewards have a positive impact on the performance and 
the free-riding behaviour is defused thanks to the interaction of approval 
incentives and horizontal monitoring mechanisms.  
The NBER and GSS surveys analysed by Freeman et al. (2010) confirm these 
results and show also that shared capitalist compensations are significantly and 
positively related to anti-shirking behaviour. Where payment is related to the 
team performance it is more likely that workers take actions, reporting and 
monitoring poor performance by fellow employees.  Moreover, the surveys show 
that co-monitoring activity is motivated not only by self-interest and by the 
concern to receive lower bonuses but also by the fact that workers are benefiting 
from voluntary cooperation and are interested in reinforcing high standard work 
norms.   
Another important experiment on teams and team incentives is proposed by 
Boning et al. (2007) that analyse a very rich panel data on one specific 
production line operating within U.S steel minimills, “the rolling mills”, where 
steel is transformed into bar products.  Their research paper represents a very 
interesting study on the implementation of group incentives and problem-solving 
teams in the manufacturing sector.  
The authors were interested in the examination of the impact of these innovative 
HRM practices on productivity and searched to find out why these practices 
haven’t been adopted more broadly through the economy.  
Similar to the studies I have been analysing, in this paper the authors are 
focusing on the important contribution to productivity given by the so called 
“within effect”, how workers’ knowledge and mutual learning can raise the 
output of the production line. 
In their model output is the result of workers’ effort in performing effectively 
and efficiently their tasks, but it is also the result of exerting problem-solving 
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activities. For example, finding remedies to production flaws or implementing 
new ideas to improve productivity. These are usually costless activities, which 
don’t need further investments but they are just exploiting workers’ more direct 
and complete understanding of the production process. 
The group incentive pay of the model is represented by 
€ 
I = βpf e1,e2( ) + γ  with 
€ 
β 
and 
€ 
γ  respectively the incentive and the base pay. 
€ 
p  shows the revenues less the 
marginal cost per unit of output. Instead, 
€ 
T  reflects the presence of a formal 
problem-solving team structure. 
As the principal-agent model suggests, the principal aims at maximizing his 
expected profits: 
€ 
π e1,e2( ) = E 1− β( )pf e1,e2( ) − k − sT − γ[ ]  
 
The agent, in turn wants to maximize the following utility function: 
 
€ 
u W ,e1,e2( ) = −exp −r W − c e1,e2( )( )[ ]  
 
€ 
r  is a risk-aversion parameter, 
€ 
W  is income and the function 
€ 
c  is the disutility of 
effort. 
For the estimations of the productivity effects of teams and incentives, the 
authors consider the following dependent variable, also called the Yield rate 
measure: 
 
€ 
Yit = α0 +α1Iit +α2IitTit +α3CitIitTit +θXit + uit  
 
with 
€ 
α1 the effect of incentives adoption, 
€ 
α2 the impact from the joint adoption 
of incentives and problem-solving teams while 
€ 
α3 represents the impact on 
output from the interaction between complexity, teams and incentives. Variable 
€ 
X  reflects instead the set of control variables that can influence the final 
outcome. 
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Henceforth the experiment includes the productivity regressions, first for the 
incentives and for the incentives plus teams. The results show that incentives 
alone and incentives together with problem-solving teams do raise performance. 
Further regressions measure the coefficient for the interaction term 
€ 
α3. This is 
positive and highly significant, also when controlling for fixed effects, showing 
the important result that in complex production lines, when teams are added to 
the adoption of incentives, the coefficient is even greater.  
Teams provide the competitive advantage when adopted together with group 
incentives, especially for these lines that are inherently very complex, while they 
do not make the difference for productivity differentials in the case of low 
complexity lines. 
Connected to these results there is evidence that when complexity increases in 
the minimill production, the likelihood to adopt teams more than doubles. 
These findings are important because they corroborate the theoretical predictions 
on the positive effect of optimal incentive payment systems. Moreover, they add 
the important conclusion that the returns to group incentives are enhanced when 
combined to team-based job design, like problem-solving teams. Through these 
you give greater opportunity to workers to react to incentives, by letting them 
more decision power, more flexibility, and discretion on alternative and creative 
methods of production. 
Boning et al. provide also the explanation why these HRM practices are not 
adopted in all businesses. The authors believe that because of the different 
business environments, there are some settings where the returns from these 
practices cannot compensate the implementation costs they carry. In their 
experiment they highlighted that problem-solving teams are more profitable 
when they are introduced in very complex production lines. In plants where 
processes are not so complex and produce simpler commodities, standard 
production operating strategies are preferred.  
Of course, whether companies will find it profitable to adopt teamwork and 
therefore group incentives will depend also on other issues, which consider 
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business idiosyncrasies, the workers’ characteristics, their cognitive orientation 
and cultural background. Through the experiments I have illustrated in this 
section, researches controlled for these variables and the positive results on 
companies’ performance from the regressions appear to be only slightly reduced.  
 
3.2 Profit sharing 
 
Profit-sharing payment plans belong to the set of new HRM practices and shared 
capitalism strategies that act as incentive programs in order to prompt workers 
efforts for a greater firm’s productivity. According to the data from US and 
European organizations, profit sharing is the most common shared capitalist 
mode of pay followed by gain sharing, firm ownership plans and stock options.   
Profit sharing represents also an opportunity to give a homogeneous incentive to 
all production lines’ workers, without endangering any cooperation between 
them. Formal profit-sharing plans mean that companies should set a target for 
profits. When this target is met then a part of the amount above the target is 
equally divided among employees. This amount can be paid in cash bonuses but 
it can take also other forms, like contributions for retirement or companies’ stock 
ownership. 
This type of compensation can be a device companies decide to introduce when 
they want to keep the cost of labor flexible to their financial conditions and don’t 
want to commit ex ante to a certain amount of incentive. However, this is not the 
only reason why companies think profit sharing can positively affect the firm 
productivity. Profit sharing appears to have a selection effect, attracting and 
retaining higher quality human capital, and an incentive effect; workers are 
motivated to increase their efforts and to cooperate for the best production 
outcomes. 
In a very recent study on profit-sharing schemes in Canadian workplaces, Long 
and Fang (2013) analyse data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 
conducted from 1999 to 2006. The two authors elaborated two panels of 
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longitudinal data, one of a three-year period the other for a five-year period 
subsequent to profit-sharing adoption reported by year 2001.  
Long and Fang’s aim is to look for workplace productivity followed by the 
implementation of a profit-sharing type of compensation. Their research wants to 
be representative for the Canadian economy and hence includes data of 
workplaces from larger companies and diverse industrial sectors. 
From OLS multiple regressions and, after controlling for a wide set of variables, 
findings highlight a significant and positive growth in workplaces’ productivity 
in both panels. 
This study has, though, a major interesting result. It does in fact include in the 
regressions the presence of teamwork for the establishments where profit sharing 
is adopted. The data analysis reveals an even greater increase in productivity 
where these two practices interact. These results suggest that profit sharing can 
have a positive effect on productivity but that teamwork supports and enhances 
this effect. Based on the experiments I have described, this result is not 
surprising; employees working in a team are likely to overcome the possibility of 
shirking behaviour linked to profit sharing plans. In addition teamwork induces 
and activates other implicit incentives that are positively related to better 
performance. 
One more time we have the evidence that high-involvement and shared capital 
HRM practices perform better results when they are introduced together and 
when they can interact. 
Long and Fang analysed also the establishments that introduced teamwork but 
that did not adopt profit sharing. In this case productivity was showing a 
substantial decrease over the study period, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis of Jones et al.; HRM innovative practices are more effective and 
produce the desired incentives if they are associated with appropriate reward 
systems so as to ensure that the workers are aligning their interests with the 
company’s goals.  
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3.3 Employees Ownership 
 
Employers can provide other very successful incentives to their workers by 
utilising financial tools for a direct and active participation of the employees in 
the interests of the firm.  Through these practices, employees can become 
themselves owners of the company in which they work, adopting rights and 
responsibilities, which tie them closer to their workplace. 
The Shared Capitalism Research Project, described in the paper by Freeman et al. 
(2010), defines the American attitude towards these practices while the Pepper 
IV Report of 2009 give us a clear understanding which practices of employee 
financial participation are more diffused among European companies.  
According to these studies there are several forms of employee ownership and 
they vary according to country and to customs. In the US, for example, The 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is one of the building block tools for 
collective financial participation and is now very diffused also among other 
Anglo-Saxon countries, like United Kingdom and Ireland. With this plan 
companies make contributions to a workers’ trust, the so called ESOT, which 
buys worker shares of the company. The trust can be financed also by other 
financial institutions, like a bank, by shareholders that want to sell their shares, or 
by a loan from the employer company. This practice of collective share 
ownership encourages employees to invest in their company giving them an 
additional benefit to their basic wages, and therefore an incentive to be more 
productive. Moreover it represents a very interesting instrument for companies’ 
capitalisation and for business succession. ESOP has become in fact a very 
appealing practice also in the EU, especially among unlisted SMEs, as it 
facilitates the transfer of ownership and of retiring shareholders’ shares.  
Other financial participation schemes allow companies to adopt compensation 
plans where employees can buy shares in the firm and vote those shares privately 
or they can buy shares of their firm directly in the stock market. Workers can 
then benefit from retirement pre-tax contributions from these payments, like in 
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the US with the 401k plan or from discounts on the share price, like in the United 
Kingdom. 
Such compensation plans are very popular among companies as they are 
providing the incentive to workers to act and think like owners and therefore give 
them an incentive to take the actions that are in the firm’s interest, adopt a higher 
degree of commitment and increase their effort at work.  
Companies can grant also stock options to their workers. Employees receive the 
right to buy stock options at a set price during a specific time period following 
the granting of the option. They can hence get the gain coming from a rise in the 
share price without the risk of loosing part of the investment. This practice was 
adopted mostly by start-ups, smaller firms with more volatile stock returns or 
negative cash flows. 
However this practice leads to doubtful results. First in the actual incentive effect 
it is supposed to provide to workers, secondly because it carries a high-degree of 
risk and agents may not perceive it as offsetting the expected gains. Oyer and 
Shaefer (2004) experiment on stock option grants for middle-level executives, 
which I analysed in Chapter 2, gives for example the result that this practice acts 
as an incentive only in specific circumstances and that its adoption can be mainly 
due for its selection effects, providing to the company attraction and retention of 
higher qualified workers.  
Hence, employee financial participation, in the form of profit-sharing plans or 
share ownership, is a modern tool in the hands of the management but it 
represents also a powerful and innovative mechanism for countries to support 
their economies and meet the necessities of the labor market.  
Employee financial participation can benefit both companies and workers. It 
permits to organisations to be more flexible and to adapt better to the economic 
environment. Their human capital, instead, is encouraged to be more involved in 
the production and decision processes which incentivises to be more productive, 
as workers feel they can better reap the benefits of their companies’ success.  
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Possible problems of moral hazard, related to share capital payment methods, can 
be offset when complementary HRM practices are implemented. The 
introduction of teamwork appears to be the most effective one, as it activates 
implicit incentives and approval incentives, inducing workers to peer monitoring.  
According to the research papers and studies I have been analysing, the shared 
capitalism way seems to be the one, which is successful. Obviously companies 
differ in their needs and not all business environments are well suited for team-
based production, employees’ ownership or profit sharing. It is the task of the 
management to provide the right balance among the diverse stakes and at the 
same time boost the company’s performance. It is not an impossible task and we 
have seen that many companies that introduced these innovative HRM practices 
have gained the desired results. However the implementation of a single practice 
alone has not led to the same success as when more practices are adopted 
together. Moreover, when introduced into the production process, these 
innovative tools lead to several behaviours, also undesired ones, because of the 
related explicit and implicit incentives they promote.  
For all these reasons, shared capitalism is the successful way when a 
complementary approach is adopted. The interplay among all the various 
practices is the key for its effectiveness. Which of these practices, how they are 
introduced and to which extent, all this belongs to the decision of the 
management. This has to be made in accordance to the business in which the 
company operates, to the human capital and to other influencing variables like 
the political and economic environment.  
In the following chapter I will analyse very interesting studies on the 
complementarity approach for the introduction of high-involvement HRM 
practices. The evidence is telling and supporting the above described results.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Technology of HRM 
 
In the last century we have witnessed the evolution of personnel and 
organisational governance. Taylorism organised the assembly line in very simple 
routines for a very standardised type of production. Individuals represented just 
another input in the production function and the machines incorporated most of 
the technological know-how.  
In order to respond to the changes of the market and because of a greater 
integration and competition among countries, firms had to respond and 
reorganise their production processes, with also new forms of HRM. 
New management perspectives have seen the rise in the last decades.  The well-
known example of the Toyota’s Lean Manufacturing System represented a 
radical change for companies’ management. In this system knowledge and 
decision power were redistributed to the frontline employees, work was 
reorganised around teams, and a greater emphasis was given to the quality of the 
production.  
This innovative approach to work organisation was not limited to Japanese 
companies and high-performance work systems have spread worldwide with 
similar features.  
Today we speak about Shared Capitalism as an innovative system of practices 
and incentives, which help companies to adapt to a new economic end 
institutional environment, preserve competitiveness and boost productivity.  
The experimental literature and the theory support the expectation that this high-
involvement work practices, present in a lean type of production and together 
with financial participation programs, are the key for improved performance. 
However, the experiments I have been analysing in the previous chapters support 
the view that the innovative HRM practices and incentives are subject to 
complementarities. If we introduce these practices together, in fact, the overall 
	  	   48	  
result will be much greater than the sum of the marginal benefits coming from 
each single practice. For example, if we introduce team incentives we have 
necessarily also to adopt some measures that enhance team cooperation and 
communication, that create team identity and that sustain high-effort norms. 
These can be obtained by giving teams decision power or by delegating them 
problem-solving activities, which in turn have to be matched by a 
complementary training activity. Another useful solution would be establishing a 
system of values within the organization that creates group identity and trust 
based relationships.  
Build in a coherent system, these measures have an incentive effect and hinder 
the possibility of moral hazard.  
The view that bundles of HRM practices are chosen in order to raise TFP, 
suggests that management can act like a technology; there are sets of good 
practices that, when adopted, actually increase the productivity of the firm.  
If this is the case then it becomes challenging to understand why all companies 
do not adopt the same practices. Indeed, we still have to answer to the question 
why there is so much heterogeneity in the productivity of companies, within the 
same country but also within the same industrial sector. 
Many theories that investigate the diffusion of technological innovations 
recognise that the implementation of new technologies is rather a slow process 
and learning curves are generally S-shaped. 
The introduction of a new technology or of a new system of management 
practices means that companies have to undertake considerable implementation 
costs that are usually not immediately offset by the returns. Hence, managers 
may not face the right incentives in terms of costs/benefits in order to introduce 
the innovation.  
Moreover, the diffusion of a particular technology is closely dependent on the 
idiosyncrasies of the potential adopters: the technology in use, the organizational 
structures, information and learning processes, and network externalities. Firms 
differ in their resources as well as in the opportunities they have to innovate and 
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to imitate. Henceforth, there are many aspects that can account for the retardation 
factor of diffusion and for the differences in the resulting productivity.  
Evolutionary theory deeply describes diffusion dynamics and highlights the 
importance of path-dependency and endogeneity in the adoption of an 
innovation. Indeed an organization will very likely improve its practices based on 
its actual experience and knowledge, through learning by doing or by problem-
solving activity.  
Consequently, if the production activity is locked in an inferior practice and the 
management has not the incentive to make a breakthrough investment, the 
company will maintain the inferior routine. The major implication of such 
behaviour will be multiple equilibria. There is no one single solution to the 
maximisation problem and you cannot predict in which equilibrium the system 
will end, since it will depend on the technological starting point. This can be 
valid for systems of production, of corporate governance or personnel 
governance.  
The major source for this path-dependency will be the complex interactions 
between many complementary practices and features of the business, and these 
will determine local optima. Indeed complementarities decide for the marginal 
returns of a new practice and if the management of a company ignores the 
various interdependencies it will fail to realise the full potential of the 
innovation. The company that wants to introduce a new HRM practice has to 
consider the synergies with the actual system of production and develop if 
necessary the corresponding activities which actually enable the innovation.  
Complementary practices are, therefore, an important source for competitive 
advantage and they can constitute a system that insulates the company from the 
risk of imitation.  
According to the neoclassical theory the institutional and technological 
environment in which the firm operates is exogenously given so that competitive 
behaviour will lead to the establishment of an optimal system of arrangements. 
However, this view does not explain why there still exist productivity gaps and 
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why apparently inefficient systems survive. Instead, if we adopt the approach of 
evolutionary theory and acknowledge the important implications of 
complementarity and fit among all the organizational elements we would 
recognize the existence of local optima.  
In the previous chapters I have been analysing HRM arrangements, focusing in 
particular on high participation work practices. The evidence from several 
experiments shows clearly that these practices are very successful but we are fare 
from affirming that they have to be universally adopted. The majority of the field 
experiments are confined to the Anglo-Saxon context and little research has been 
carried out in different operating environments.  
Subsequently I will describe complementarities from a theoretical and 
experimental point of view. Data sets and field experiments are supporting the 
theory and confirm the conclusions of the studies I have been earlier describing. 
 
4.1 Complementarities 
 
Edgeworth idea of complementary activities was that if we increase the level of 
some actions then we will also increase the marginal revenues coming from the 
complementary ones. 
In Milgrom and Roberts (1995), lattice theory and supermodular functions 
support the theoretical background for complementarities. 
Given a lattice 
€ 
X,≥( )  and a subset of it, the sublattice 
€ 
S . 
€ 
S  is closed and contains 
the elements 
€ 
x  and 
€ 
y , the meet operation 
€ 
x ∧ y , i.e. the lower constraint, and the 
join operation, 
€ 
x ∨ y , i.e. the upper constraint. These are defining the boundaries 
of the subset, according to the original order 
€ 
≥.   
The main implication is that if we want to increase the value of one variable we 
can also increase the value of the others. In other words, the increase of one 
activity does not mean we have to decrease other ones.  
Given a real-valued function 
€ 
f  over the lattice 
€ 
X , 
€ 
f  is supermodular and its 
arguments are complements if and only if, for any 
€ 
x  and 
€ 
y  in 
€ 
X , 
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€ 
f x( ) − f x ∧ y( ) ≤ f x ∨ y( ) − f y( ). By increasing variable 
€ 
x , I raise also the returns 
of a change in variable 
€ 
y , i.e. if I increase any of the two arguments then the 
marginal returns will be higher than the sum of the marginal benefits of 
increasing the single components. The objective function of a firm is therefore 
supermodular in the set of its decisions.  
Milgrom and Roberts offer a very interesting model where the supermodular 
function for the company is represented by profits. These are defined by 
€ 
π = qP q,r( ) −C q,i( ) . Hence profits depend on the quantity produced 
€ 
q, by the new 
product innovations 
€ 
r  and by the number of process improvements 
€ 
i . The 
properties of supermodular functions predict increasing marginal profits in 
€ 
r  and 
€ 
i , and consequently in 
€ 
q. An increase in one of the arguments will increase the 
attractiveness of the other.  
Moreover the authors specify other supermodular functions associated with the 
costs of undertaking product innovations. For instance, the costs related to the 
design and adjustment of the production system, the costs for efficiency, and the 
costs for flexibility in production.  All these are supermodular functions as their 
arguments are mutually enforcing and increasing one of them does reduce the 
overall costs of the decision.  
The theory underneath complemetarity suggests that within companies there are 
many variables, which have to move in a coordinated way according to the 
changes of the operating environment. These variables can mutually enhance 
each other, either because they share the same objective or because one hinders 
the negative effects created by the other.  
Indeed the second derivative of our production function will not be negative in 
the case of complementary practices and technological innovation performs 
dynamic increasing returns to scale.  
In the language of game theory, the unilateral change of one variable will lead to 
lower benefits with respect to the case in which decisions are centrally 
coordinated, so that a Nash equilibrium can be reached. In practice, in a company 
with a decentralised decision system, problems of non-coordination games may 
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arise and if the management fails to acknowledge the complementarities 
involved, the company will not reap the potential benefits and incur also in 
losses.  
In the classical example of the manufacturing production, the shift from the 
traditional mass production, the Ford system, to lean production, the Toyota 
system, represented a radical change in the automobile industry; it was the rise of 
a new technological paradigm. Though, the implementation of a new system of 
production could not be limited by the change of only some variables.   
Milgrom and Roberts take the example of GM, which was once one of the most 
successful automobile producers. In the 80s GM made an investment in new 
capital equipment and robotics, associated with the lean production method, but 
failed to make any change in its governance policies and in the production and 
decision routines. As a consequence, during the 90s the company registered 
negative profits and lost its competitiveness in the automobile industry where 
once it was a leader. 
In their paper the authors oppose the GM case with a very successful example of 
a company that implemented a consistent system of production and management, 
Lincoln Electric. This is a leading and expanding global company in the 
manufacturing industry from over 60 years. Its success is attributed to its system 
of checks and balances, which include employment policies, production 
processes and strategies. 
The incentives system of Lincoln Electric is build on the correlation between 
piece-rates, employee ownership, bonuses, internal mobility, and extensive 
training.  
The drawbacks of a piece-rate type of payment are prevented by the application 
of a bonus system, which is based on an assessment for quality and cooperation. 
Employees take part to financial participation programs, which provide the 
opportunity to have a share in the company’s revenues, in order to better reap the 
fruits of their higher efforts. In turn, these practices sustain the commitment of 
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the company to permanent employment, enhancing employees’ trust and 
commitment.  
These and more other practices demonstrated to be complementary and were 
supporting for the long-term competitiveness of Lincoln Electric.  
 
4.2 Empirical Analysis 
 
Pil and MacDuffie (1996) propose a very interesting study on complementarities 
and focus narrowly on the adoption of the set of high-involvement work 
practices. Their study offers an empirical analysis of a longitudinal data set for 
automobile assembly plants worldwide.  
The authors’ aim is to test several hypotheses, which support the theory of 
complementarity for HRM practices and which are consistent with the 
evolutionary approach. The first hypothesis the authors investigate is if the 
adoption of high-involvement practices is correlated to prior usage of 
complementary HR practices and technologies, like flexible automation.  
The other hypotheses instead assume the correlation of HRM practices with 
companies’ poor performance, less experience of the employees with the current 
system, and organizational and institutional disruptions. 
Strategic management should consider the important role of complementarities 
because, as the theory predicts, they are likely to reduce the costs of 
implementing innovative procedures. 
For the first hypothesis the OLS regression analysis displays a significant 
correlation between the early adopted HR practices and the later high 
performance work practices. The technology in use instead does not appear to 
have a significant impact. This can be given by the fact that new technological 
arrangements were seen rather as a substitute to high-involvement HRM 
practices. One more time, this result suggests the idea that we can consider the 
system of HRM like a technology in which the firm can decide to invest.  
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The authors found no significant association between bad performances, 
measured in vehicle defects and workers’ productivity, and consequent adoption 
of new HR practices.  
Moreover, the authors tested if longer workers tenure within the company, and 
therefore longer experience with a system of practices, would not decrease the 
probability of introducing a new set of practices. Workers might be more 
resistant to change also because they have to bear part of its costs. Contrary to 
expectation the two variables were instead positively correlated. Workers with 
longer experience in their company were more at ease in familiarising with new 
practices, perhaps because trust and cooperation are stronger. 
With respect to disruptions, the study searched for a correlation between past 
layoffs and adoption of innovative practices. The regression showed no impact. 
Though, this can be because layoffs can be perceived as a disruptive event that 
instead fosters cooperation and change.  
Finally, the study analyses the effect of major organisational and institutional 
changes on the probability of introducing the innovative management practices. 
The data show that where major disruption took place, like plant expansions or 
new product lines, there was a positive association with high-involvement 
arrangements. This finding highlights that the company that faces major 
challenges owns also a greater opportunity to undertake “competence-destroying 
change”, as the authors call it in their paper, because the costs for undertaking the 
transitions are minimised. 
Although the study performs great variances in the results, the most significant 
association with the adoption of high-involvement practices was represented by 
the complementary HR practices, which the company had already implemented 
in its activities.   
Therefore we can affirm that companies appear to prefer clusters of related 
arrangements in the management of personnel. 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) offer another cornerstone study for the 
complementarity approach in HRM practices. In their 1995 paper they analysed a 
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database on the steel industry, which contained information of 26 steel plants on 
productivity, work practices and production technology.  
While other studies were focusing more on the productivity effects by single 
practices, this paper is very interesting because it provides the results from the 
adoption of a coherent set of management practices. These practices concerned 
recruiting, payment systems, mobility, workers’ security, training, 
communication and also labor relations. 
Productivity was specified as the amount resulting from the density 
€ 
γ  and the 
volume of the steel 
€ 
wit ∗git ∗ sit ∗hit( ) , per month and for each line. The actual 
quantity produced 
€ 
Qit  will then depend on the delays in the product line. 
More formally, productivity will be represented by the equation 
€ 
Qit = γ wit ∗git ∗ sit ∗hit( )[ ] 1− dit( ) . In turn delays are the result of vintages, quality of 
the steel input, equipment, maintenance and HRM. In practice, the dependent 
variable in the regressions is represented by uptime and is measured by the 
following equation: 
 
€ 
1− dit( ) = α it + β'Xit + γ 'HRMit +ε it  
 
where 
€ 
Xit  includes the remaining control variables, for each plant at any given 
time. 
Before looking at the results in terms of productivity, the study revealed a very 
strong correlation among HRM variables and showed that generally high-
involvement practices exist only when other innovative practices are already 
present. For instance, one of the foremost results of the study is the positive 
correlation of line incentives with teamwork, greater communication and 
information stream between workforce and management, greater value in the 
recruitment process, job flexibility and employment security.  
Therefore the authors decided to undertake the productivity regressions on a few 
most common coherent systems of HRM, with a set of fine-grained controls. 
	  	   56	  
The authors selected four main systems of possible HRM practices, going from a 
system of traditional methods to the most innovative ones, and estimated the 
productivity impact.  
The findings show clearly that HRM practices have a significant impact on the 
productivity of the line, and they define a hierarchical pattern. Indeed, when a 
company moves from the more traditional system to the most innovative one, 
productivity raises of around 7%. 
Moreover, as the theory predicts, while the impact of bundles of complementary 
variables is positive and significant, the effects on productivity for individual 
HRM practices appear to be much lower.  
Finally, the study tests the impact on the quality of the product by taking as a 
dependent variable the percentage of total line production that met defined 
standards. The results are noteworthy. Indeed they imply that when the 
production is supported by a system of advanced HRM practices, the percentage 
of high-quality products increases significantly.  
These findings clearly highlight that systems of high-involvement HRM 
practices are successful and when implemented they increase the employees’ 
performance. The evidence, though, is that adoption is not straightforward, even 
in the case of a very homogenous steel line production, like in the latter study. 
Great variances, indeed, exist within same countries, same industries and same 
products. 
Implementation costs play an important role and companies not always face the 
same incentives for a systemic change in their operations, especially if they have 
a short-run revenues approach. However, irrespectively of relative prices, the 
company will decide for its managerial structure and procedures because of the 
actual practices in use or because of other features, which belong to the industrial 
context in which the company operates.  
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4.3 HRM and Innovation 
 
New forms of HRM practices and the synergies among them are important 
sources for companies’ productivity. In the introduction of my work I highlighted 
the issue of wide productivity differentials, which resist also when we focus on 
the industrial sectors and on homogeneous goods, see, for example, the 
Ichniowski et al. (1997) analysis between steel production lines. The experiments 
I have previously illustrated clearly evidence that there are systems of high-
involvement HRM practices that act like incentive packages and determine 
higher productivity rates. The competitive advantage of a company is also 
dependent on its ability to innovate and to provide the right responses to changes 
in the dynamics of the market.  
However, while there is a wide theoretical and experimental agreement on the 
positive relation between new high-involvement HRM systems and companies 
performance, less has been said about the relation to innovation.  
Patents and appropriability, operating sector, ICT, these and more represented 
preferred issues to investigate in relation to innovation. Hence, if we consider 
managerial features and forms of personnel management acting like a 
technology, it will be interesting to answer also to the following question: does 
the adoption of such HRM systems also matter for the likelihood of innovation? 
I will try to answer by providing the results of two studies, which have filled this 
research gap. Unfortunately the data are limited in time and space, and we are not 
able to compare the results from similar businesses or countries. Nevertheless, 
the following examples provide relevant information and are consistent with the 
evolutionary and organizational theory, as well as the experimental findings I 
have been early describing.  
The first study I present is the work of Laursen and Foss (2003). Based on a data 
set of about 1900 Danish manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms, the 
authors centred their study on the impact of two main HRM systems of practices, 
which emerged from their analysis, on the probability of introducing innovation. 
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The first system of practices includes performance-related payment, teamwork, 
quality circles, delegation of responsibilities, and planned job rotation. The 
second system, instead, is based on employment training, both externally and 
internally.  
Both sets of HRM practices appear to be strongly significant for the likelihood of 
product innovation. Formally the probability of innovative performance is given 
by 
€ 
a = β1x,β2z( ), where 
€ 
x  is the adoption of HRM practices, while 
€ 
z  reflects 
other variables like firm size, operating sector, external linkages to research 
institutions and other standard variables, which are commonly considered as 
important determinants for innovation. 
The study, therefore, supports the hypothesis that organisational innovation, in 
the form of a new type of HRM systems, and technical innovation are strictly 
linked. 
Laursen and Foss complete their analysis by mapping the HRM packages to 
industrial sectors, according to Pavitt taxonomy. The results show that the first 
system of HRM practices is more linked to scale-intensive sectors, like 
manufacturing firms. Here product quality improvements and cost cutting 
technologies are highly valued. According to Pavitt (1984) in these business 
sectors the opportunities for innovation are endogenous to the firm and are given 
by internal learning processes (learning by doing, learning by using and learning 
by interacting). The industrial dynamics for innovation appear to be consistent 
with the personnel governance methods of the first system.  
On the contrary, intensive use of employment training shows to be positively 
associated to wholesale and service intensive sectors. In these business activities 
innovation can be conveyed from outside the company, through suppliers for 
example or through knowledge institutions. Consequently, training programs 
have to be part of the company’s routines.  
According to the evidence we can state that the actual system of HRM practices 
is related to the way of organising the activity of search and experimentation 
within industries. As Pavitt acknowledged, the business in which a company 
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operates determines very specific dynamics of innovation activity, and personnel 
governance could be considered part of these dynamics. 
The second study I will analyse concerns British and French private companies. 
Lorenz et al. (2004) aimed at identifying possible links between a system of 
employees’ active participation and representation and the capacity of a company 
to create new products and services.   
The sample gives the opportunity to compare the adoption rate of high-
involvement work practices in diverse regulatory settings. Indeed the labour 
legislation in the two countries differs in many aspects. The most outstanding is 
the reliance of French companies on collective bargaining, union and non-union 
employees’ forms of representation. UK on the contrary has a less regulated 
labour market, with more flexibility in hiring and firing procedures.  
Through cluster analysis the authors identified four main groups of HRM 
arrangements for the French and the UK context. Two of these groups represent 
high participation work practices, which include workgroups, job rotation, 
suggestion schemes and other forms of knowledge sharing. The two systems 
differ in that the first one includes also performance related payment and a 
greater use of quality circles. 
Following a hierarchical order the last two clusters represent a hybrid and a 
traditional form of personnel management.  
These four clusters were not set a priori but emerged directly from the statistical 
analysis for both settings with variation in the percentage of firms belonging to 
each group. 
The subsequent logit regression highlights first of all that complementarities 
among HRM practices are better suited for innovative performance than the use 
of stand-alone practices. Secondly forms of employee participation and 
representation are complementary to high-involvement HRM system and are 
representing a precondition for the realisation of innovation.  
This latter finding shows to be more significant for the UK context. Here, 
because of the quasi absence of legal requirements for collective negotiations 
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around working conditions and less employment security, if the employer 
decides to introduce mechanisms of decentralised decision making the effects in 
terms of innovation will be substantial. Practices of employees participation elicit 
in fact greater commitment and cooperation from the worker, reduces the 
possibility of distributional conflicts and induces the firm to invest more in firm-
specific skills and employee training.  
In turn, these are knowledge development practices that will be successfully used 
in the design and development of new products.  
French companies perform a similar positive association between innovation and 
high-involvement practices, though, because the institutionalisation of 
participation mechanisms, the coefficients are weaker than in the UK context. 
These findings support therefore the theoretical predictions and the existing 
empirical evidence that high participation work practices enhance workers 
commitment and are likely to establish a relationship of trust with the 
management. Workers participate to knowledge sharing and development 
processes, acquire more firm-specific skills and finally increase the opportunities 
for innovation.  
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Conclusions 
 
The main purpose of my analysis was to respond to the following questions: 
What determines productivity differentials between countries, industries and 
production goods? To what extent does strategic human resource management 
matter for the performance of the company? Can we affirm that there exists a set 
of best HRM practices that determine higher productivity levels and support the 
competitiveness of the company? 
Bloom, Van Reenen and Sadun research papers suggest that strategic human 
resource management decisions play a fundamental role for business 
productivity.  
Following their findings and pursuing the road of human resource management I 
developed an extensive review of the actual theoretical and experimental 
literature on incentives and innovative forms of HRM practices.  
These are high-involvement and high-performance work practices. They can be 
shortly described as the instruments that give workers the opportunity to 
participate and have a leading role in decision making routines, that give workers 
the necessary skills and aim to constantly improve it, and that provide the 
necessary rewards, in the sense of payment and promotion schemes.  
These practices include: performance related payments, teams, quality circles, 
financial participation, training, job rotation, and suggestion schemes, just to list 
a few of them.  
Facts and figures show that in the US and within Europe performance related 
payment systems have rapidly increased in the last decades.  The evidence shows 
positive results for businesses, in particular for their productivity and innovation.  
Through laboratory and field experiments the general picture evidences that in 
manufacturing, retailing, services, and also in the public sectors of health and 
education, innovative HRM practices are a source for successful business 
activity. 
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First of all I focused on performance related payments in the form of individual 
incentives. From the empirical analysis we can draw the following important 
conclusions: piece rates usually improve the productivity of the workforce 
because of the incentive and the selection effect; risk aversion and shirking 
behaviour represent possible impediments for the success of the incentive; the 
management should implement consistent systems of complementary practices in 
order to actually reap the benefits of the incentive. 
Indeed, together with the financial incentive the company should adopt 
monitoring mechanisms to hinder the drawback of moral hazard. Instead, in 
order to allay risk-aversive behaviour, the company should adopt appropriate 
organisational structures so as to directly involve workers in the decision-making 
processes. 
On the contrary, when the pay and the wealth of the employees are directly 
linked to the performance of the team, the production line, or also of the firm, 
then we talk about group incentives. These are preferred practices when the 
marginal product of the worker is harder to observe.  
These types of incentives appear to be related to other high participation work 
practices, which together can be labelled as Shared Capitalism practices. 
Therefore Shared Capitalism includes financial participation programs like profit 
sharing, stock ownership, gain sharing, and stock options. In addition they are 
coherent also with other HRM arrangements like teamwork, decentralised 
responsibility and decision-making, and extensive use of training activity. 
These practices, acting in concert, show to boost the company’s productivity, the 
wellbeing of the employees, and the quality and innovativeness of production. 
With this innovative type of management, workers are induced to work harder 
because of the monetary incentives but also for the related implicit incentives. 
For instance, they benefit from the social approval of their colleagues and from 
the greater responsibility and decision power over the production operations. 
These related benefits increase workers motivation to work and to adopt 
reciprocal behaviour in the form of voluntary cooperation. 
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This latter aspect shows to be very important for the well functioning of the 
group incentives because it offsets any kind of free riding behaviour. 
Indeed, contrary to the theoretical predictions, the experimental literature showed 
that group incentives and shared capitalism arrangements are actually related to 
anti-shirking behaviour.  
Whatever the type of performance related payment scheme, the literature 
certainly evidences that high involvement work practices are successful across 
industrial sectors. Though, most studies show also that they cannot be 
implemented individually.  
In order to be effective, they have to be included in a consistent system of HRM 
practices; incentives can have the expected results only together with a 
supporting bundle of practices belonging to recruitment, training, monitoring 
procedures and to other formal and informal organisational structures. 
In general we can affirm that stand-alone personnel management practices are 
not effective and that complementarities play a key role in understanding their 
actual relation with the performance of the company.  
Indeed, high involvement HRM practices are a system of complementary 
arrangements which when adopted act like a technology: they can improve the 
production capacity of the company and support innovation advances. 
Although the positive results across experimental studies, companies still vary in 
the adoption of these practices and high productivity differentials persist also at 
the four-digit level.  
Hence principal-agent theory does not suffice anymore for the explanation of the 
adoption of one HRM strategy instead on another. Evolutionary theory and 
Organisational economics better suit to the argument, since they acknowledge 
the significant relation between complementary aspects and companies’ 
performance.  
According to these theories companies will decide for their HRM strategy based 
on their organisational form and on the practices in use. These internal operations 
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will in turn interact with external dynamics belonging to the market and the 
economic environment. 
The existence of these interdependencies and because of path-dependency and 
cumulative change, will decide for a given set of HRM practices, even if this is 
inferior with respect to other systems.  
From these insights we can conclude that companies will usually end into local 
optima. The bundle of HRM practices of each firm will determine a very rugged 
fitness landscape in which the opportunities to change for a better technology are 
limited and established by complementary and interdependent organisational 
aspects.   
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